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CCTV AND THE 2010 VANCOUVER GAMES: SPATIAL TACTICS AND
POLITICAL STRATEGIES
Micheal Vonn*
This paper is a brief discussion of CCTV surveillance of public demonstrations from a legal geography perspective, looking at CCTV as a spatial tactic. This paper focuses on this issue in the context of the 2010 Winter Games
in Vancouver and comments on the political strategies being used in re†
gards to CCTV for the Olympics and more generally.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many aspects of CCTV that are legitimately contested
and illustrate various nuances in the use and impact of video surveillance.
For example, there is research which would indicate that video surveillance
in a given context may cause fear in some people, yet be a reassurance to
others.1
However, almost nobody seems to dispute that cameras aimed at
protesters are not there for the protestors’ benefit. They are not for the
protesters’ “safety,” nor to “facilitate” their use of public space. Cameras
situated primarily for the purpose of capturing expressive activity are not for
the speakers, but rather are deployed against the speakers.
There is not much support for any other view and, indeed, even police organizations concede this point when it is their own ox that is
gored⎯such as the New York Police Union, which in 2006 sued the City of
New York for photographing and videoing off-duty officers at a public
demonstration protesting the pace of their contract talks.2 The police union
*
Micheal Vonn is a lawyer and the Policy Director of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. She has been an Adjunct Professor at the University of British Columbia
(UBC) Faculty of Law and UBC School of Library, Archival and Information Studies. Ms.
Vonn is an Advisory Board Member of Privacy International. The author wishes to thank
Nicholas Blomley for his guidance and assistance.
†
This article was written in the run-up to the 2010 Winter Olympics. While appropriately
1,000 CCTV cameras were put up for the Olympics, the security authority abandoned their
plans for “free speech zones,” presumably in response to the considerable negative publicity
and vocalized public concern.
1
See, e.g., Nils Zurawski & Stefan Czerwinski, Crime, Maps and Meaning: Views from a
Survey on Safety and CCTV in Germany, 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 51 (2008), available at
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles5(1)/maps.pdf.
2
Jim Dwyer, Surveillance Prompts a Suit: Police v. Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at
A1.
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claimed that the heavy-handed surveillance tactics which, of course, are
routinely used at war protests and anti-poverty marches, were a violation of
the police officers’ rights to free speech.3 Clearly, the visual surveillance
increasingly being used to monitor public expressive activity has a chilling
effect that is almost assuredly one of its aims.
Visual capture makes us much more identifiable in public space to
authorities and erodes our public anonymity. Our public anonymity is not a
matter of being unrecognizable, but, as Alan Westin puts it, of being able to
blend in to the “situational landscape.”4
The loss of public anonymity affects freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, and public politics in general. So CCTV surveillance in the context of public demonstrations affects who says what, and how and where
they say it.
This paper is a brief discussion of CCTV surveillance of public
demonstrations from a legal geography perspective. It specifically looks at
CCTV as a spatial tactic. This paper focuses on this issue in the context of
the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver and comments on the political strategies being used in regards to CCTV for the Olympics and more generally.
II. CCTV AS A SPATIAL TACTIC
Legal geography deals with the intersection between space and
law.5 It highlights the fundamental importance of spatial concepts in the
law, for example, the critical importance of spatial concepts like property,
borders and jurisdictions, and the distinction between public and private as a
foundational organizing principle of most rights theories.6 Legal geography
unpacks the assumptions about space that are embedded in the law and tries
to understand these connections.7
A “spatial tactic” is the “use of space as a strategy and/or technique
of power and social control.”8 So-called “mega-events” such as the Olympics provide an embarrassment of riches for students of spatial tactics, particularly those tactics dealing with the policing of public space and the control of expressive activity.
3

Id.
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967).
5
See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 3–6
(1994).
6
See generally id.
7
Id.
8
Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (quoting
Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 1, 30 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga
eds., 2003)).
4
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The best primer on spatial tactics and their relationship to public
speech in the U.S. context is Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First
Amendment Liberties in Public Places by legal scholar Timothy Zick.9 Zick
describes how the space needed for democratic discourse, which he terms
“the expressive topography,” has been dramatically reduced by the steady
erosion of public space through privatization and development, a vast array
of spatial tactics of containment and displacement, and First Amendment
legal doctrine that views space as abstract and fungible.10
Most people’s understanding of the importance of place, in terms of
their rights, is pretty crude. We typically use the language of and imagine
ourselves as “rights-bearing individuals.” It is implicit in this idea that our
rights go where we go⎯at least in so far as we are in our own country⎯which is why people are often stunned to discover how ludicrously
byzantine and non-intuitive the geography of rights actually is.
For example, in British Columbia we have a type of so-called “safe
streets” law that seeks to regulate panhandling.11 This is a boilerplate type
of law that is seen in many jurisdictions.12 It prohibits “solicitation” in certain zones and makes it illegal, for example, for the Chief of Police to solicit
donations for the Raise-a-Reader literacy campaign within a certain distance
of a bus stop or for Brownies to sell their cookies too close to an ATM machine. And it is not just the Brownies who are unlikely to know this; the
Chief of Police might also be unaware. The point is that there is little understanding of how imperative place is to rights. Place is where power and
rights are contested. That is what public expression is about.
However, the more highly “securitized” the place, the less likely it
is to be a site of spatial contention. Securitization, and particularly visual
surveillance, has become a commonplace spatial tactic. While the U.K. is
infamous as the cake-taker regarding public surveillance by CCTV, many
cities in North America are following in step.13
Securitization through visual surveillance is often cited as a technique for displacement, i.e., to discourage the supposedly “criminogenic

9

TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES (2009).
10
See id. at 25–64. See also Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive
Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439 (2006).
11
Safe Streets Act, 2004 S.B.C. (Ca.).
12
See, e.g., Safe Streets Act, 1999 S.O. (Ca.) (provincial law from Ontario that bears
strong resemblance to British Columbia’s Safe Streets Act).
13
See NOAM BIALE, EXPERT FINDINGS ON SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS: WHAT CRIMINOLOGISTS AND OTHERS STUDYING CAMERAS HAVE FOUND (2008), available at http://
youarebeingwatched.us/tools/4/.
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others” who are the targets of “broken windows”-inflected policing.14 Yet
much less has been said about the increasing CCTV presence at the traditional sites of assembly for public expression and contention. Additionally,
surprisingly little has been said about the use of CCTV in the nontraditional sites that are specifically designed for protest and surveillance,
such as the already notorious “free speech zones” currently being built for
the 2010 Winter Games in Vancouver.15
III. CCTV AT THE 2010 GAMES
As Philip Boyle and Kevin Haggerty have pointed out, surveillance
architecture is not a mere by-product of hosting the Olympics; it is an actual
“deliverable.”16 It is an explicit “legacy.”17 Just how many CCTV cameras
would be coming to Vancouver for the 2010 Olympics has been almost impossible to determine much in advance of the Games. Academic papers
have spoken of the near impossibility of getting a straight answer to the
question of cameras much in advance of the Games.18 Recently, the Integrated Security Unit (ISU) has said that there will be “approximately 900”
CCTV cameras at venues and “another 50–70 in the urban domain.”19
As Boyle and Haggerty note, “[s]urveillance should not be narrowly
construed as simply referring to spies or CCTV cameras. Instead, surveil14

DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC
SPACE 199–204 (2003). The “broken windows” thesis of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling argues that crime can be reduced by reducing public “disorder” (symbolized by broken
windows). See James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MAG., Mar. 1982, at 29, available at http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/. Broken windows theory has been
rigorously criticized for, among others things, purporting to justify the criminalization and
displacement of the public poor.
15
2010 Olympic Security Plans Include “Free Speech Areas”, CBC NEWS, July 8, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/07/08/bc-olympic-security-plans-freespeech-areas.html.
16
PHILIP J. BOYLE & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, PRIVACY GAMES: THE VANCOUVER OLYMPICS,
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 5 (2009), available at http://www.surveillanceproject.org/sites/
default/files/Privacy%20Games.pdf.
17
Id. at 13 (quoting Peter J. Ryan, Olympic Security—The Relevance to Homeland Security, in OQUIRRH INST., THE 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES SECURITY LESSONS APPLIED TO
HOMELAND SECURITY 26 (2002)).
18
Laura Huey, The Surveillance Legacy, What Happens to Vancover’s Camera Surveillance Systems After the 2010 Olympics?, in THE SURVEILLANCE PROJECT, A REPORT ON
CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA: PART TWO—SURVEILLANCE CAMERA AWARENESS
NETWORK (SCAN) 66 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/
files/SCAN_Report_Phase2_Dec_18_2009.pdf.
19
Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Frequently Asked Questions [hereinafter
Integrated Security Unit], http://www.v2010isu.com/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=516&
languageId=1&contentId=6821 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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lance involves collecting and analyzing information about populations in
order to direct their behavior.”20 Despite the ludicrously low estimate of one
hundred and seventy-five million dollars for Olympic security,21 the Vancouver Games security forces have about one billion dollars to put towards
that effort.22
We know that the cameras that will be used at the Vancouver
Olympics venues and so-called “live sites”—which are securitized public
gathering and entertainment sites in the city centre23—could well capture
expressive activity should someone, say, unfurl a “Free Tibet” banner in one
of the chillingly termed “Clean Venues” that are supposed to be free of
“propaganda” such as political speech.24
However, aside from incidental capture of speech, the CCTV deployment that is meant primarily to capture expressive activity is, of course,
the CCTV that will be aimed at what Olympics officials and security authorities call “free speech zones” or “safe assembly areas” and are popularly
known as “protest pens.”25
Protest pens are very clearly and blatantly an infringement of free
speech. The bizarre semantics around the Vancouver Games’ designated
protest areas are that the security authorities maintain that they are voluntary, which is true. This begs the question: who then would volunteer to be
penned? We have to assume that such volunteers are people who do not
know their rights, and because they do not know that they can legally protest in just about any public place, they are easily corralled into a contained
area to be readily monitored and recorded. Or these are people who actually
believe the security authorities’ line that the protest pens constitute an “enhanced service.” The “enhanced service” notion is explained as the police
having scoped out all the good, high visibility venues (“location, location,
location”) and helpfully providing those venues for the convenience of the
protesters.26
20

BOYLE & HAGGERTY, supra note 16, at 8.
See 2010 Olympic Security Costs Could Hit $1b, Says Minister, CBC NEWS, Oct. 10,
2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2008/10/10/bc-2010-security-costsone-billion.html.
22
Id.
23
GEN. MANAGER OF THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC OPERATIONS OFFICE ET AL., 2010
WINTER GAMES LIVE SITE CONCEPT PLAN 3 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://vancouver.
ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20070918/documents/rr2.pdf.
24
IOC REQUIREMENTS ON BRAND PROTECTION AND TICKET TOUTING 2, http://www.culture.
gov.uk/images/freedom_of_information/AnnexAforCase24489.pdf.
25
See, e.g., Clashes Break Out at Summit Protest, CBS NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/20/nafta-summit.html?ref=rss.
26
Steve Mertl, No Corrals for 2010 Olympic Protesters, CTV VANCOUVER, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.ctvolympics.ca/news-centre/newsid=17910.html.
21
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The Olympics Integrated Security Unit has confirmed that there will
be protest pens,27 and police say that these pens will have “closer access” to
the site of the Games than the protesters could achieve elsewhere in public
space.28 What they have not said⎯but can be determined through other
means, specifically the timelines for venue construction29⎯is that designated protest zones are estimated to take eight days for each to be “built.” An
eight day build would indicate that there is much more than mere fencing
involved. It is strongly suspected that most of the “build” will be surveillance architecture.
CCTV, in conjunction with the segregation of protestors, not only
monitors protest messages and facilitates identification, but also brands the
protesters as dangerous. It is expected that like some of the highly stigmatizing designated protest zones that have been created recently in the U.S.,30
the protest pens at the Vancouver Games are likely to be largely, or even
entirely, unused. Even if the sites are not used, they will reduce the expressive topography available for protest and stigmatize protesters generally.
The element of containment, along with highly visible surveillance equipment, is essentially the architecture of fear. Even if it sits empty, the protest
pen will be a “message” that is sure to get media coverage. This is expensive messaging that is tax-payer sponsored, with the “high tech props” likely re-allocated to domestic policing without any consultation or debate.
This certainly does not mean that protest outside of the protest pens
will be surveillance-free. Since security officials can hold cameras or even
wear body-mounted cameras, protestors who avoid designated protest sites
will not necessarily elude video surveillance. They are likely to encounter
mobile video surveillance elsewhere, but they too can hold cameras, and
they are more likely to be able to hang on to those cameras for their own
purposes⎯such as police accountability⎯if they are not penned in.
In addition, since the Vancouver Games will see hundreds of independent legal observers deployed by NGOs to monitor the policing of protesters, protesters are apt to be videoed by legal observers as well as by the
police.31 Therefore, avoiding the protest pens is more realistically an attempt
to equalize the surveillance equation rather than actually eluding surveillance altogether.
27

See id. See also Integrated Security Unit, supra note 19.
See Vancouver Police Department, 2010 Olympic FAQs, http://vancouver.ca/police/
index.html (follow “Major Policies and Initiatives” hyperlink; then follow “The VDP and the
Vancouver 2010 Olympics” hyperlink; then follow “VDP Olympics FAQs” hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010).
29
Venue Commissioning Schedule (on file with author).
30
ZICK, supra note 9, at 2.
31
Darcy Smith, The Watchers, VANCOUVER MAG., Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.vanmag.com/
News_and_Features/City_Life/The_Watchers.
28
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There are many reasons why protesters might avoid the protest
pens, including resisting their implicit messaging. Protest pens, as a spatial
tactic to contain and stigmatize dissent, are not dependent on CCTV, but
CCTV is arguably a very important feature of this spatial tactic.
CCTV is increasingly deployed at those sites where its primary
function is to capture expressive activity, such as the ever-more common
CCTV aimed at the traditional speakers’ corner of the public park.32
I suggest that even a lone camera in such a situation is effectively a spatial tactic. The camera is proxy for a formal designation of that
public space as captured by the authorities. In other words, these cameras
create a de facto protest pen which undermines the function of public space
as the stage for free assembly by branding public speakers as potentially
dangerous.
IV. POLITICS OF CCTV
The politics of CCTV are substantially evident in the context of the
Olympics. CCTV installations at “mega-events” are increasingly extensive
and elaborate and increasingly re-purposed for mundane policing purposes
post-event. The importing of CCTV for a mega-event essentially endows
the host city with surveillance infrastructure while sidestepping the political
grief of justifying the expenditure. The cameras are conveniently available
for adoption by the host city after the event, and the legacy deals being
made behind the scenes are very difficult to oppose because it is very difficult to unearth them ahead of time.
This is one aspect of what I have referred to as the great CCTV
shell-game, discussed recently in a paper by Laura Huey. Through a Freedom of Information (FOI) request, Huey was able to discover that the Vancouver Police were in negotiations for Olympic legacy cameras.33 The details of these negotiations are still very vague, but it is interesting to look
at how even the fact of the negotiations appear to have been deliberately
obfuscated.
Privacy advocates making a similar FOI request to the Vancouver
Police Department were originally told that the scope of the request needed
to be narrowed in order to respond in any reasonable timeframe.34 The Vancouver Police “helpfully” recommended that the request be narrowed to a
32

See, e.g., Alicia Wong & Kiersten Ow, CCTV Installed at Speakers’ Corner, CHANNEL
NEWS ASIA, July 25, 2009, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/
view/444612/1/.html.
33
Huey, supra note 18, at 67–68.
34
Interview by Micheal Vonn with Paul Holden, Member of the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association Privacy and Access Committee, in Vancouver (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file
with author).
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specific police department in order to expedite the request.35 After a further
wait of many months, the specific police department that the privacy advocates were referred to responded with “no records [are] responsive to
your request.”36
Privacy advocates note that such apparent institutional efforts to foil
resistance to CCTV are, unfortunately, extremely common.37 The City of
Vancouver, for example, was adamant that the CCTV cameras for the livesites at the Olympics were going to be “temporary.”
The [staff] report ask [city] council to accept provincial “funding for the
deployment of temporary CCTV during the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic
Winter Games.” The report used the word “temporary” 19 times. Despite
written assurance, several councilors including COPE Coun. Ellen
Woodsworth—the lone dissenting vote on council—raised concerns about
the “temporary” nature of the CCTV plan and the potential erosion of civil
liberties.38

The insistence on the “temporariness” of the cameras became increasingly
shrill as privacy advocates publicly pointed out in the media the incongruity
of the City building a permanent control center at the City’s emergency
operations center for its supposedly temporary cameras.39
Finally, the City was forced to amend its position, saying that when
it used the language in its various documents and press statement of “tem-

35

Id.
Id. Cf. Stanley Tromp, Records for 2010 Olympic Games Go Missing, GEORGIA
STRAIGHT, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.straight.com/article-141228/olympic-records-gomissing. The former FOI director Darlene Kotchonoski explained that:
[S]he had been told by the secretariat [of the Vancouver Organizing Committee for
the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (Vanoc)] that it had decided to
stop recording minutes of its meetings, without explanation. In addition, she added,
because the ministry can no longer locate any minutes of Vanoc meetings, those
records cannot be obtained either. (Although Vanoc is not covered by the FOI law,
the copies of its records it had sent to the ministry had been accessible because the
ministry itself is covered by the law.).
Id.
37
Huey, supra note 18.
38
Mark Hasiuk, City Admits Surveillance Cameras Here to Stay in Vancouver,
VANCOUVER COURIER, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www2.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=
27da28a5-7b85-4ccd-a8fd-bdf0013c6ac5&sponsor= (quoting KEVIN WALLINGER, DIR.,
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY DURING THE
2010 OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES—ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDING FOR
TEMPORARY CCTV 1 (2009), available at http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/cclerk/20090326/
documents/csbu7.pdf).
39
Hasiuk, supra note 38.
36
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porary” cameras, they had, of course, meant “re-deployable” cameras.40
Permanent “re-deployable” cameras, as it turns out.
One of the great mysteries of CCTV politics is the question of why
police and public officials are so often seen using these kinds of obfuscation
tactics in order to get their hands on CCTV when the vast majority of the
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that CCTV has little or no efficacy
as a security mechanism.41
A trend that I suggest is worth investigating is how often CCTV
shows up as a kind of “free prize.” The Olympic legacy cameras are a clear
example of this, but there are many others. Much of the proliferation of
CCTV in the U.S. is the result of the lure of funding from the Department of
Homeland Security.42 We see a similar move in Canada where money is
made available in special grants from federal and provincial governments
for cities and municipal transportation systems to get CCTV.43 Therefore,
not only is there a general failure to debate the merits of CCTV in given
communities, but there is no cost-benefit analysis because the costs are essentially “laundered” through a different part of government.
Incidentally, there are many other examples of this funding
arrangement nullifying assessments of local priorities. This is extremely
evident, for example, in the surveillance of personal health data. Federal
government grants support centralized electronic health records systems in
individual provinces.44 Many of the provinces would undoubtedly spend
those health dollars in a very different fashion if they could⎯that is, if
the subsidy were not exclusively for an allocated project, the benefits of
which are highly contested and for which evidence of deleterious effects are
growing.45
40

Hasiuk, supra note 38.
MARTIN GILL & ANGELA SPRIGGS, BRIT. HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 292,
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CCTV 61 (2005), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
rds/pdfs05/hors292.pdf.
42
See ZICK, supra note 9, at 298 (“In fiscal 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
requested more than $2 billion to finance grants to state and local governments for homeland
security needs. A substantial portion of those funds were used to purchase and install
[CCTVs].”).
43
See, e.g., Kevin Walby, Little England? The Rise of Open-Street Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance in Canada, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 29, 44 (2006), available at www.
surveillance-and-society.org/Articles4(1)/littleengland.pdf (for example, Brockville, Ontario
received a $158,000 grant from the province to purchase cameras).
44
See generally CAN. HEALTH INFOWAY, ANNUAL REPORT: BUILDING A HEALTHY LEGACY
TOGETHER (2008–2009), available at http://www2.infoway-inforoute.ca/Documents/ar/
Annual_Report_2008-2009_en.pdf.
45
See generally OFFICE OF THE INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R, INVESTIGATION REPORT F10-02:
REVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM AT VANCOUVER COASTAL
HEALTH AUTHORITY KNOWN AS THE PRIMARY ACCESS REGIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
(“PARIS”) (2010), available at http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/investigation_reports/
41
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In these types of situations, the political equation is not a question
of this project versus another more important, more meritorious project. The
political equation is money for this initiative or no money at all. Presumably, this is a significant factor in the question of why politicians and security
authorities are so ready to go to the wall for CCTV systems that the most
cursory research would show will not increase safety and will not reduce
crime.46
Since it is “free money,” it does not really matter if there is no return on the investment. This, I suggest, is increasingly becoming an insidious form of internal policy laundering and the primary means of quashing
meaningful debate on CCTV and other surveillance systems.
As a final note on the politics of CCTV, part of the wonder of the
preparations for the Winter Games in Vancouver is what appears to be the
brazen illegality of so many of the public control measures demanded by the
International Olympic Committee.
The City of Vancouver was forced to reassess the legal wisdom of
some of its Olympics bylaws in light of a constitutional challenge⎯bylaws,
for example, prohibiting “non-celebratory” signage.47 The legal challenge to
the Olympics by-laws has garnered considerable media attention.48 However, unlike the Olympics by-laws, which are definitely controversial, there
are other security measures for the Olympics that appear to be entirely accepted and taken for granted which might also be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
Wes Pue and Rob Diab recently published a paper about how in
Canada there is no statutory or common law authority for the police to
create special “securitized zones” and “security perimeters.”49 Many people
might argue that it would be impossible to police an event such as the
Olympic Games without the legal authority to create securitized zones. The
point is that currently there does not actually seem to be any such authority.
Similarly with CCTV, there are public spaces that will be blanketed
with CCTV during the Vancouver Games, and virtually no one is surprised
InvestigationReportF10-02.pdf; ROSS ANDERSON ET AL., DATABASE STATE (2009), available
at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/database-state.pdf.
46
See, e.g., GILL & SPRIGGS, supra note 41.
47
Posting of Geoff Dembicki to the Hook, http://thetyee.ca/Blogs/TheHook/Olympics
2010/2009/11/26/bylaw-changes-free-speech/ (Nov. 26, 2009, 14:32).
48
See, e.g., Vancouver’s Worrying Civil Liberties Rollback, MCGILL TRIB., Oct. 14, 2009,
http://media.www.mcgilltribune.com/media/storage/paper234/news/2009/10/14/Opinion/Edit
orial.Vancouvers.Worrying.Civil.Liberties.Rollback-3802696.shtml.
49
Robert Diab & Wesley Pue, Security for the 2010 Olympics: British Columbia Needs a
“Public Order Policing Act” 1–2 (July 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with UBC
and Capilano University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1388602.
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by that. Yet there is very little case law that would guide us in determining
if or when such sweeping public surveillance is permissible under the Canadian Constitution. The practice makes it seem like this issue of constitutionality must have been settled, but in fact it is not.
V. CONCLUSION
For various reasons, going after the Olympic CCTV cameras on a
constitutional question is almost assuredly a loser and bound to make very
bad law. The security rationale is very apt to be found by a court to be too
compelling in that context, but I suggest that the legacy cameras may be
ripe for challenge, and the ideal challenge is almost certainly aimed at cameras that are primarily situated to capture expressive content. This constitutional challenge could be brought on the grounds not only of section 8 rights
to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, but also sections 2(b) and (d)
rights to freedom of expression and of association.50 The use of CCTV as a
spatial tactic to chill public expression is ripe for both legal and theoretical
exploration.

50

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11,
arts. 2(b), (d), 8 (U.K.).

